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Abstract This paper explores how government venture
capitalists approve or reject financing applications.
Based on longitudinal observations, complemented by
interviews, documentation, and secondary data, the
findings show the limited influence of the regulative
and normative logics (e.g., formal guidelines and ac-
cepted behavior) on government venture capitalists’
decisions. Instead, individual decisions are observed to
be largely overshadowed by cognitions and heuristics,
which dominate formal regulations and socially con-
structed group-level norms. Although official decision
communications state that regulations have been follow-
ed, the evidence suggests that the cognitive logic dom-
inates the funding decision-making process through a
set of overshadowing forces that restrict the influence of
the normative and regulative logics on funding deci-
sions. This research has implications for venture financ-
ing and highlights the importance of cognitions in shap-
ing venture capital decisions.
Keywords Government investment . Venture
financing . Venture capital . Entrepreneurship .
Institutional theory . Decisionmaking
JEL D01 . D23 . D25 . D73 . D81 . D91 . G24 . G28 .
G41 . L26
1 Introduction
The entrepreneurial finance literature highlights the
need to understand a variety of financial sources besides
traditional venture capital to better understand the fi-
nancing of high-growth-potential ventures and hetero-
geneity in venture capitalist decision making (Block
et al. 2018; Drover et al. 2017). Traditional venture
capital research dominates the entrepreneurial finance
literature, even though only 1% of ventures secure such
funding (Drover et al. 2017; Kaplan and Lerner 2016).
This paper focuses on government venture capitalists
(GVCs), a relatively neglected group of financiers in the
entrepreneurial finance literature (Colombo et al. 2016).
Government venture capital (GVC) has been a key
feature in extending the supply of financing to new
and innovative ventures, specifically in their early
phases, to ensure financial support for diverse types of
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entrepreneurs, minorities, and sectors and to support
growth opportunities where external financial support
is crucial (Gorman et al. 2005; Bertoni and Tykvová
2015). For example, based on the decisions of GVCs,
the European Union (EU) allocated €3.621 billion to
finance competitiveness and innovation in European
ventures between 2007 and 2013. Taxpayers’ money is
the single largest source of venture capital, making
GVCs quite unique and differentiating them from tradi-
tional venture capitalists (EVCA 2014). However, the
impact and contribution of GVCs should not be
underestimated. In 2014, governments in Europe pro-
vided 35% of early-stage venture finance (Invest Europe
2015). The magnitude of these figures is likely to be
representative for numerous countries outside the EU
(Bertoni and Tykvová 2015). Difficulties for ventures in
raising finance are increasingly pertinent for internation-
al, national, and local government institutions. The trend
of such support is expected to become even more im-
portant in the future (Block et al. 2018).
The conditions under which government financiers
operate suggests that understanding the decisions be-
hind government financial support is problematic and
challenging. Government financial support is highly
controversial because it represents the distribution of
funds from the tax system and the transfer of public
money to specific individual ventures with commercial
interests. When financial support succeeds by allowing
the development of successful ventures, it is argued that
society as a whole receives future benefits in the form of
employment growth and the creation of new technolo-
gies and innovations (Croce et al. 2018; Luukkonen
et al. 2013). Despite the proposed benefits associated
with government financial support, government finan-
ciers face greater scrutiny in relation to their decision-
making processes. These financiers must respond to and
consider multiple interests, including those of the mar-
ket (e.g., finance, product, market, and management
potential) and politicians (e.g., social responsibility, en-
vironmental, rural survival). This balancing act creates
complex situations for GVCs to deal with and general
uncertainty in predicting future business potential
(Gorman et al. 2005; Leleux and Surlemont 2003;
Luukkonen et al. 2013; Colombo et al. 2016).
In addition, as external evaluators in charge of mak-
ing balanced, responsible decisions to distribute public
funds to the private sector, GVCs are also at a disadvan-
tage with respect to venture management, which may
possess inside information that is difficult for
government financiers to access (Gabrielsson and
Huse 2002). Accordingly, these financiers make invest-
ment decisions in an uncertain and complex environ-
ment where multiple interests must be considered
(Gorman et al. 2005). The value provided by GVC
investments is heavily discussed in the literature, but
the evidence of GVCs’ effectiveness is mixed (Lerner
2002; Cumming and Johan 2019). GVC has had debat-
able results in many countries (Lerner 2012; Lerner and
Watson 2008; Bertoni and Tykvová 2015). GVCs are
nevertheless considered catalysts of regional economic
development (Zhang 2018), aiming to support regional
ventures in markets where traditional venture capital is
thin. They thus complement traditional venture capital
by bridging the financial gap (Bertoni and Tykvová
2015) and providing a certification effect in front of
private venture capital, this by decreasing information
asymmetry (Martí and Quas 2018). GVCs are expected
to provide social value, yet failing to provide financial
value may raise reputational concerns and questions
over the public program and the GVCs’ efficacy. There
is an ongoing debate on how much social returns and
rural survival should be allowed to cost (Abrardi et al.
2019; Colombo et al. 2016).
Many previous studies have considered the macro
perspective of country-specific policies or have examined
GVC programs and their impact on performance (Block
et al. 2018; Brander et al. 2014; Cumming andMacIntosh
2007; Cumming et al. 2017). However, there is a lack of
studies exploring the demands placed on GVCs in their
decision-making processes. This study aims to reduce
this gap by contributing to the entrepreneurial finance
literature, particularly the venture capital literature, by
enriching our understanding of institutional mechanisms
and organizational behavior in GVCs’ decision-making
processes (Block et al. 2018; Drover et al. 2017). By
providing rich empirical insights coupled with an induc-
tive, longitudinal, qualitative study of the decision meet-
ings of GVCs, we answer numerous questions related to
government financiers’ decision-making processes: How
do GVCs balance regulative procedures, group norms,
and their own cognitions or judgments when making
decisions? How do they achieve balanced and responsi-
ble decisions concerning the distribution of public funds
to the private sector? Are they able to make objective
decisions that follow the regulations, or do they ultimate-
ly follow some other decision-making process?
Although the study was inductive, we found that
GVCs’ decision making was influenced by cognitive,
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regulative, and normative issues, which led us to draw
on institutional theory (Scott 2014) to understand how
GVCs make decisions. The institutional perspective
enabled us to thoroughly explore the GVC sector, spe-
cifically the institutional pressure and the endeavor to
capture organizational legitimacy and providing of ven-
ture support (Campbell 2004; Ruef and Scott 1998). The
inductive findings also led us to draw on the literature on
organizational decision making to understand the mul-
tiple pressures placed on GVCs and the bounded ratio-
nality enacted by GVCs in their decision making (Guler
2007). The combination of institutional theory and or-
ganizational behavior enabled us to enhance our under-
standing and extend the applicability of institutional
behavior in the entrepreneurial finance context (cf.
Guler 2007).
We provide insights into the institutional behavior that
guides decision making, where institutional regulations,
norms, and cognitions are typically not aligned
(Greenwood et al. 2011; Lawrence et al. 2011). Accord-
ingly, this study makes a theoretical contribution to the
institutional theory dialog by showing how dominant
logics influence decision-making processes in the GVC
context (Bertoni et al. 2015). A key finding is that cogni-
tive logic dominates decision-making situations where
regulations and norms are not aligned. This finding has
not been observed in previous studies of cases where
regulations and norms are not aligned (e.g., Greenwood
et al. 2010). In fact, this study shows that cognitions
consistently overrule norms and regulations in venture
support, which is an interesting finding for a study of
government decision makers. The empirical results identi-
fy four overshadowing forces that mitigate and compen-
sate for the regulative and normative influences on financ-
ing decisions. These findings extend existing research in
this area of GVCs’ decision making by Thornton et al.
(2012), Greenwood et al. (2011), and Scott (2014),
forming the basis of what we call the cognitive
overshadowing effects in venture funding decisions. We
discuss the implications of our research for GVC practice.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Contextualizing government venture capitalists’
decision making
GVCs have specific differences from traditional well-
documented venture capitalists. GVCs play a role in
financing ventures that are not secure enough to acquire
bank loans. GVCs thus provide funding at a relatively
low capital cost to ventures that may not yet be able to
secure funding from traditional venture capitalists
(Colombo et al. 2016; Gorman et al. 2005). Examples
of ventures that may be supported byGVCs include new
or innovative ventures facing particularly high uncer-
tainties or with less obvious potential for return on
investment (ROI; Block et al. 2018; Croce et al. 2018;
Luukkonen et al. 2013). Another important difference is
that GVCs’ support for ventures may serve certain po-
litical goals by, for instance, strengthening important
sectors that rely on government interventions and that
lack access to finance from free markets and venture
capital (Bertoni and Tykvová 2015; Clarysse et al. 2007;
Colombo et al. 2016). Accordingly, when ventures are
aligned with certain political goals, GVCs are willing to
take higher risks, and they lower their ROI requirements
with respect to other types of financiers (e.g. banks).
Consequently, GVCs do not operate under the single
measure of ROI, which is a core form of macro logic in
traditional financial markets, particularly venture capital
(Croce et al. 2018; Colombo et al. 2016; Davis 2009;
Luukkonen et al. 2013; Zajac and Westphal 2004).
Perhaps the most noteworthy difference in this realm
is how venture capital distributions are regulated. GVC
is derived from supranational or national sources and
depends on political will and taxation for its existence
(Colombo et al. 2016). This scenario creates major
complexity and imposes substantial constraints on deci-
sion making. For example, the government funding of
this study derives from both national and European
Commission sources of funding. Accordingly, finan-
ciers’ investment decisions are regulated by internation-
al laws and legislations. In performing this investment
decision, these financing bodies must comply with mul-
tiple political macro logics, including those of the Eu-
ropean Commission, national, regional, and local mu-
nicipality regulations, and political directives. A further
complicating factor is that these regulations and political
directives are subject to constant change between and
during government administrations. Each level of the
regulations and political directives contains multiple
macro logics, including concerns for the environment,
society, and quality of life. Ventures are intended to
contribute to developing an attractive area in which to
live, increasing employment rates, and aiding innova-
tion and business growth (Colombo et al. 2016). All of
these factors imply that the financing decisions of GVCs
How individual cognitions overshadow regulations and group norms: a study of government venture capital...
require the balancing of political targets, policy aims,
alternatives, and venture potential.
This study builds on existing research on traditional
venture capital that focuses on how venture capitalists
assess investment potential (Drover et al. (2017). Early
research on venture capitalists showed that they use a
wide range of factors when evaluating business poten-
tial (Gompers et al. 2009). More recent research has
provided a more nuanced view of decision making
beyond rational formulas and rigid approaches,
looking into the subjective and interactive nature of
venture capital decision making (Kirsch et al. 2009;
Petty and Gruber 2011). Scholars have proposed cog-
nitions and the multifaceted and contingent nature of
decisions as promising areas to advance the venture
capital literature (Drover et al. 2017; Malmström et al.
2017) and go beyond the obvious. Studies have shown
that venture capitalists are unaware of their decision
making; self-retrospection is a difficult task (Sharma
2015). The present study answers calls for knowledge
on the organizational behavior and institutional mech-
anisms underlying venture capitalists’ decision making
(Petty and Gruber 2011).
2.2 Institutional influences on government venture
capitalists’ decision making
From the contextual background where GVCs make
decisions, we acknowledge institutional influences on
decision making. Building on Scott’s (2014, p. 33)
widely used theoretical conceptualization, we view in-
stitutions as consisting of regulative, normative, and
cognitive logics that give meaning to, constrain, and
guide social behavior. The widely used institutional
theory enables us to understand organizational phenom-
ena such as subtle and prevalent formal and informal
organizational structures (Battilana et al. 2009;
Greenwood et al. 2010; Scott 2000). These structures
are the rules of the game in the social setting that also
affect goals, beliefs, and behavior (Ahlstrom and Bruton
2006; Scott 2014).
The core idea of Scott’s (2014) framework is that all
institutions have a formal regulative influence that reg-
ulates, shapes, and constrains behavior. This regulative
influence is based onwell-defined social obligations and
taken-for-granted assumptions concerning social reali-
ties (Judge et al. 2008). Regulative influence is typically
expressed through formal rules and legal sanctions
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott and Davis 2007;
Thornton et al. 2012). The less formal normative influ-
ence refers to established policy and professional stan-
dards and procedures (Bezemer 2002; Scott 2014). Nor-
mative influence determines professional and social ob-
ligations and guides behavior that is established socially,
thus defining the roles and actions expected of individ-
uals (Johansson 2007; Scott 2014; Scott and Davis
2007; Trevino et al. 2008). Cognitive influence, the
most informal influence, reflects cognitions that are
shared among individuals such as shared perceptions
of what is taken for granted (Busenitz et al. 2000;
Scott 2014). Shared cognitions are based on values,
cultural rules, and symbols that form social reality,
increasing understanding and guiding behavior
(Farashahi et al. 2005; Zucker 1977). According to
studies of venture capital firms, institutions affect the
formation of goals and processes (Wright et al. 1992).
Institutional influences affect organizational mem-
bers’ interpretations and actions. Behavior encompasses
a coherent set of assumptions and values that are deeply
embedded in actors’ cognitions and preferences. It de-
fines what is perceived as meaningful and appropriate in
decision-making situations (Tolbert et al. 2011). Recent
studies have begun to explore cognitive, normative, and
regulative influences due to pressure from internal and
external conditions and to study how such pressure
affects organizational behavior (Biniari et al. 2015;
Souitaris et al. 2012). Scholars studying how to deal
with institutional influences and face conflicting institu-
tional pressures have shown that rules and norms at-
tached to such conflicting pressures constrain and regu-
late while also empowering innovation and enabling
strategic use of different institutional demands
(Thornton et al. 2012).
This study reveals specific insights into cognitive
influence in a complex, incongruent decision-making
environment where the above-mentioned institutional
forces are non-aligned. Being non-aligned implies that
regulative, normative, and cognitive influences may
push a decision in different direction with different
forces. Striving to act rationally requires a balancing
act when regulation and norms are non-aligned
(Thornton et al. 2012). Based on this view, we examine
the investment decisions that GVCs must make to bal-
ance competing cognitions, norms, and regulations
when assessing ventures and interpreting preferred de-
cision outcomes. Our study shows that investment de-
cisions are difficult for financiers to manage as social
beings (Friedland 1991: 258) and that the cognitive
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influence dominates when these logics are non-aligned.
These logics are expected to compete in this uncoordi-
nated setting, where financiers are pressured to deal with
these incongruences (Binari et al. 2015; Souitaris et al.
2012). Little focus has been placed on the potential
dominance of the cognitive logic when actors are
pressured by incongruent regulative and normative
logics (Greenwood et al. 2011; Lawrence et al. 2011).
This study helps explain how using the cognitive influ-
ence enables financiers to interpret uncertain, complex
investment decisions by guiding their behavior and pay-
ing less attention to other non-aligned institutional in-
fluences. Although this issue has not been previously
discussed in the institutional literature, other authors
have shown that actors’ behaviors are bounded by cog-
nitive limits on attention (Simon and Barnard 1947;
Ocasio 1997) and cognitive heuristics in decision mak-
ing (Kahneman 2003; Kahneman et al. 1982). Thus, the
present study provides further conceptual development
and offers new insights into such strategies when navi-
gating venture investment decisions. In outlining how
cognitive influence underpins investment decisions, we
show how the cognitive logic dominates the regulative
and normative logics.
3 Research method
3.1 Sample approach
We use an embedded longitudinal case study
(Eisenhardt 1989a, 1989b; Hallen and Eisenhardt
2012) of GVCs to understand the institutional logics of
venture capitalists’ organizational decision making in
general and GVCs in particular, this in relation to deci-
sions on ventures’ funding applications. The GVC in-
dustry provides an attractive entrepreneurial finance
scenario to study institutional mechanisms and organi-
zational behavior. First, government financiers fill a
critical gap in the financial market for new and innova-
tive ventures and act as catalysts of regional economic
development (Bertoni and Tykvová 2015; Zhang 2018).
Second, the investment decision making is embedded in
a highly regulated context where the use of taxpayers’
money means that the distribution of resources is ex-
pected to be efficient. Third, the decision makers are
experienced and competent in financial decision
making.
Our sample draws on data derived from observing a
group of GVCs who made investment decisions after
assessing multiple investment proposals—specifically,
for ventures seeking government financing. The select-
ed case is a Swedish GVC organization that finances
small and medium-sized ventures to foster innovation
and business growth. The government organization is
nationally anchored with subunits in regions around the
country. The general regulations are the same for all
subunits, where the regulations are linked to the specific
type of venture capital fund. Therefore, the subunits
operate geographically near the market and the ventures
they assess. The financiers in this study are passive
investors who do not actively intervene in the compa-
nies they finance. In contrast, traditional venture capital
firms typically devote considerable management re-
sources to coaching ventures (Petersen and Rajan
1995). The GVCs’ investment goals are both govern-
mental and financial (cf. Block et al. 2018), whereas
traditional venture capitalists primarily focus on finan-
cial goals. Furthermore, GVCs’ financial goals do not
primarily focus on ROI, whereas ROI is critical for
venture capital funding.
The amount of funding distributed nationwide during
the observed period was approximately €190 million.
The informants belonged to one of the regional offices.
We gathered data from seven GVC officers: two women
and five men. The average age was 54 years. All had
university degrees, mostly in business and finance. The
group’s average length of occupational experience was
17 years. The most experienced officer had worked at
the organization for 25 years, whereas the least experi-
enced officer had worked there for 2 years. The average
annual amount of funding available for allocation by
this specific regional group is €10 million.
Final investment decisions (i.e., the decision to ap-
prove or reject venture applications) were made in de-
cision meetings where the whole group of GVC officers
took part. Previous research on venture capitalists has
focused on the screening phase and the post-investment
phase. There is a lack of studies of the context where the
final formal decision is made. This GVC organization
welcomed us into their decision meetings, providing
access to longitudinal observations of the officers’ in-
vestment decision-making processes. We took part in
nine decision meetings. Scholars have called for real-
time research to capture venture capitalists’ decision
making and deal with self-rationalization bias. This
study of real-time observations based on actual decision
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situations complements previous studies of venture cap-
italists’ decision making primarily using post hoc
methods and studies using real-time methods such as
protocol and conjoint analyses typically based on exper-
imental or tentative situations (Sharma 2015; Silva
2004). The final decision meetings provided the unit
of analysis.
GVCs are generalists who typically assess and make
decisions about ventures in different industries using
less-detailed and -in-depth analyses than specialists.
The venture applications that the GVC officers assessed
in this study included ventures that operated in different
industries, requested various amounts of funding, and
varied considerably in the estimated size of their poten-
tial market, product, management credibility, degree of
innovation, geographical location, and business model.
Variations of this kind are useful in validating an accu-
rate, relevant, reasonable, and generalizable theory
(Hallen and Eisenhardt 2012). In the decision meetings
where the venture applications were assessed, the appli-
cations were either approved or rejected. In total, 125
decisions were taken.
The decision meetings took place as follows. One
GVC officer was in charge of each venture proposal.
That officer collected information on the venture, talked
to key people in the venture organization, held discus-
sions with people in the GVC-officers’ network and
with people internally in the GVC organization, and
carried out analyses. The officer in charge of the appli-
cation also presented the case to colleagues. A decision
was reached in a decision meeting where all seven
financiers were actively involved in the decision and
actively participated in conversations during the
meeting.
3.2 Data collection
We studied 125 funding decisions. Observations on
these decisions were made by a group of re-
searchers, resulting in 36 h of pure decision ob-
servation time and 105 single-spaced pages of
transcriptions. All discussions were held in
closed-door meetings. This quantity of data in-
creased the potential to identify fragmented and
complex patterns when assessing venture applica-
tions and to shed light on the institutional logics
used in the financiers’ decisions (cf. Mezias and
Scarselletta 1994). The process continued until a
sufficient number of embedded cases had been
observed and the data set was considered large
enough to meet the aims of the study. Thus, we
continued to observe decisions until a saturation
point was reached and patterns were clear and
validated (Yin 1994).
We addressed potential informant biases in several
ways. First, by taking part in meetings over 2 years, we
became close to the insiders. The financiers became
used to our presence and took no particular notice of
us during their discussions. Second, retrospection and
rationalization bias were avoided because the observa-
tions were carried out in situ in a real-world setting.
Third, we triangulated observations with follow-up in-
terviews with the GVC officers, and courtroom ques-
tions were asked in reference to actions observed in the
decision meetings. Thus, we recorded what the speaker
said and did, and we observed what others did in re-
sponse (cf. Hallen and Eisenhardt 2012).
3.3 Data analysis
We used an established three-step coding procedure
to identify the decision making of the GVCs, itera-
tively moving back and forth between qualitative
data and emerging theoretical structures (Tavory
and Timmermans 2014; Pratt et al. 2006). In the
first-order coding, we manually coded the tran-
scribed data. This initial coding was inspired by
Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) grounded theory ap-
proach, in which the stories and statements used
during the meetings and the background documenta-
tion used for financing decisions were scanned. We
searched for statements and expressions associated
with a set of guiding questions that helped us make
sense of the data. Sample questions included “What
was the rationale for the decision?” and “What were
the main arguments presented in the investment de-
cision?” In the next step, coding was discussed by
the research group. We held recurring meetings to
match individual researchers’ coding structures, with
a focus on groups of five to ten stories at a time. In
doing so, we noted very high consistency, which in
our view, strengthened the internal validity of the
research (Gibbert et al. 2008). At this stage, we
observed that the dialogs concerned the market,
product and production, finances, and human capital,
mirroring the issues identified in the traditional ven-
ture capital literature (e.g., Gompers et al. 2005;
Knockaert et al. 2010; Muzyka, Sharma 2015;
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Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001).1 Tables 1 and 2
provide descriptive data on the official justifications
for approving or rejecting applications in accordance
with these discussion and decision dialogs.
In the second-order coding process, we grouped the
discussions and data related to the first-order codes into
categories and more abstract themes about what influ-
enced the investment decision making. At this stage, we
found that the observations and decision influences
could be understood through Scott’s (2014) work on
institutions and that this understanding could be elabo-
rated upon by integrating the literature on conflicting
institutional influences of regulations, norms, and cog-
nitions (Thornton et al. 2012). The institutional influ-
ences we observed were typically non-aligned, creating
complexity that financiers must overcome when
reaching investment decisions on how taxpayers’ mon-
ey should be distributed (Greenwood et al. 2011;
Lawrence et al. 2011). Thus, the in-depth analysis of
the institutional influences of regulations, norms, and
cognitions on investment decisions was conducted
using coding and interpreted through the lens of institu-
tional theory. The coding of the discussions and the
justifications for the decisions were based on Denzin
and Lincoln’s (2011) approach of identifying three in-
stitutional influences: regulative, normative, and cogni-
tive. In the analysis, therefore, these three institutional
logics were used as categories to classify the discussions
that we observed in accordance with a content analysis
approach. When reviewing patterns from the second-
order coding, we looked for relationships, leading to the
overarching third-order categorization. In this coding
stage, we observed that the institutional influences we
identified and focused on could drive either approval or
rejection, and we used the three logics (regulative, nor-
mative, and cognitive) to differentiate patterns in terms
of what actually influenced the decision of whether to
approve or reject applications. Consequently, we coded
the presence or absence of all institutional influences for
each decision in the data set. We coded the influence
associated with each one of the regular, normative, and
cognitive institutions as positive or negative based on
the following reasoning: if all financiers attached posi-
tive values, the specific institutional influence was sat-
isfied and was coded as + 2; if some financiers attached
positive values, the influence was satisfied and was
coded as + 1; if all financiers attached negative values,
the influence was not satisfied and was coded as − 2; if
some financiers attached negative values, the influence
was not satisfied and was coded as − 1; finally, if a form
of influence was not present in the discourse, it was
coded as 0.
Based on this coding through the lens of institutional
theory, our theoretical conceptualization offers insights
into the dominance of the cognitive logic that we ob-
served in this highly uncertain and complex setting. We
also coded the discourses associated with cognitive
logic and identified four forces reflecting the essence
of cognitive logic: (1) initial perspective, (2) expression
of positive/negative feelings, (3) cognitive identity re-
striction, and (4) multiple-perspective validation. As a
final step, we conceptually developed a more abstract
overarching dimension arising from the patterns and
relationships identified in the third-order conceptualiza-
tion, explaining the dominance of the cognitive logic. At
this stage, we used the conceptualization from cognitive
dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) as an interpretative
framework to further conceptualize the dominance of
the cognitive logic in government financiers’ investment
decisions. We discuss this point further in the last part of
our findings.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Using institutional influences to understand
government venture capitalists’ decision making
From our observations and interviews, we noted how
the GVC officers relied on three interdependent institu-
tional influences that guided their discussions and deci-
sion making. Consistent with the work of Scott (2014),
we observed how the three types of influences (regula-
tive, normative, and cognitive) guided the GVC offi-
cers’ financing decisions. Table 3 provides examples of
the three institutional influences that guided GVC offi-
cers’ decision making regarding the key assessment
indicators of the market, production, finances, and hu-
man capital (Table 4).
1 Key assessment indicators in the venture capital literature: (1)
market/competitive conditions (e.g., marketing, sales, distribution sys-
tems, market dominance, customer segments, competition, and com-
petitors’ products); (2) Product/service characteristics and attractive-
ness and production issues (e.g., design, technology, business potential,
production capacity, order processing, and organizational structure and
facilities); (3) Human capital (e.g., entrepreneur/management
team/core people, capabilities, and potential); and (4) Financial (e.g.,
future potential and ROI).
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Regulative influence was always present because the
financiers worked in a highly regulated environment,
constrained by both national and international legisla-
tion and regulations (national laws, European Commis-
sion regulations, and national regulations of government
authorities). The regulative influence on GVCs’ invest-
ment decisions was based on an external orientation and
the legal sanctions that they used to justify the decision
outcomes. In their discussions of applications when
nearing a decision, the financiers commonly asked,
“What does the regulation say?” There were various
restrictions on finance, the amount of finance available
for allocation, and the time frame for receiving funds.
As one GVC-officer reported, “There is no ambiguity
when looking into the regulations.We are not allowed to
support applications that have a competitive distorting
effect.” Regulative influence was also the most explicit
influence because it could be identified not only through
Table 1 Discussions/justification for approval of applications
Key assessment indicators Official approval justification Percentage of applications
Market/product/production New or refined products/services 29.0
New markets or increased export 17.3
New technology solutions 5.1
Prioritized industry 6.7
Service in rural areas 5.1
Service industry 1.8
Sum of market/product/production 65.0
Financial – –
Human capital Establishment of new entrepreneur 29.4
New entrepreneur in new industries 1.7
Education quality, environment, or organizational development 3.9
Sum of human capital 35.0
Bold entries presented the distribution of justifications among all rejects and all approvals respectively
Table 2 Discussions/justifications for rejection of applications
Key assessment indicators Official dismissal justification Percentage of applications
General Incomplete application 0.8
Withdrawn application 15.7
Sum of general 16.5
Market/product/production No clear business concept 2.5
Competitive distorted effect 29.5
Lack of market-related conditions 4.9
Not a supported industry 23.0
Sum of market/product/production 59.9
Financial Other funding has been provided 1.6
Not financially viable 0.8
Investment can be made without support 4.1
Non-profitable business 0.8
Debt account at the enforcement authorities 0.8
Not a supported investment 13.9
Sum of financial 22.0
Human capital Not a growth generating investment 1.6
Bold entries presented the distribution of justifications among all rejects and all approvals respectively
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discussions but also through website resources, written
laws, and standardized application forms. When consid-
ering a decision, the financiers often checked and
recalled explicit material. As one of the financiers stated,
“Let’s make sure that this is in line with the rules and
application requirements; regulations only support new
investments and not the maintenance of old equipment.”
We found support for the normative influence be-
cause we observed that the financiers had established
strong norms and policies over the many years they had
worked together. This situation was evident in state-
ments such as “We have always followed this reason-
ing.” Norms and policies were typically expressed via
explicit written guidelines specified by the group and
via explicit and implicit or tacit verbal discussions. An
example of such a norm is a decision situation described
by one financier as follows: “Our written guideline on
machinery in tourism is to support eco-friendly invest-
ments.” Nevertheless, re-evaluating the policies and
norms was invariably an item on the regular meeting
agenda. The financiers discussed specific and explicit
policies and norms and subsequently changed, refined,
or confirmed them. The financiers related specific ven-
ture applications to their established norms and policies.
Common expressions included “What is our policy
regarding this?” and “Our policy is not to support this
type of business.” This evidence reflects the financiers’
normatively governed justifications of decision out-
comes. The group often discussed what they could or
could not do and how they were expected to act
Table 3 Government venture capitalists’ decision-making and use of key assessment indicators in the institutional system
Key
assessment
indicators
Institutional systems
Regulative system Normative system Cognitive system
Market,
product
and
produc-
tion
○ Prioritized/supportable industries
○ Type of companies to support
○ Supportable/prioritized geographi-
cal area
○ New markets, increased export
○ New technology solutions
○ New or refined products/services
○ Clarity of business concept
○ Competitive distortion effect
○Market conditions
○ Own norms among the group of
financiers (e.g., on businesses, support
areas, unique products, market
characteristics, and competition).
Ethical aspects of the funding. (e.g.,
entertainment machinery in tourism)
○ Although not mentioned in regulation,
supportive of businesses that
collaborate with large national
cooperation contributing to social
development
○ Own subjective evaluation of the
market, product, and production
potentials
○ Own preferences. Some more favored
than others
○ Taken-for-granted assumptions not
shared by regulation or group
Human
capital
○ Be legally competent
○ No payment defaults
○ Disqualified for running own
business
○ Increase of employment rate
○ Educational investments (quality,
environment, or organizational
development)
○ New establishment of entrepreneur
○ New entrepreneur in new
industries
○ Norms on what is relevant
(entrepreneurial characteristics,
education, experiences, and social
network). Entrepreneur’s track record
○ Individual subjective definitions of
entrepreneurs’ and key people’s
characteristics that are not shared or
mentioned in regulation or group norms
○ Analogies between situations that are
used for decision-making argumenta-
tion
Financial ○ Scope of support clear limits (e.g.,
20%–50% of the applicant’s
investment). Substantial financial
effects of investment
○ Regulations on the companies’
financial situation
○ Not bankruptcy
○ Unable to self-finance the whole
investment
○ Profitability of business
○ Degree of earlier public funding
○ Group norms on scope depending on
particular characterized situations
○ Group norms for interpreting the
substantial financial effects of
investments
○ Norms for what is acceptable counter
financing
○ Subjective perceptions of the scope of
investment; how much to support
○ Subjective expectations on future
financial performance, in comparison to
prior own experiences (e.g., of industry
performance)
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according to norms. Statements such as “All tourism
ventures can’t have a full machinery park; we stipulate
that we want them to cooperate” were common during
the discussions.
Finally, we observed that the cognitive influence was
important in investment decisions. Cognitive influence
was expressed verbally in the financiers’ discussions,
and cognitive guidance had both an outspoken explicit
character and a less outspoken tacit character. The fi-
nanciers often drew analogies with earlier situations,
asking themselves questions such as “How did we re-
spond before in a similar situation?” or “In the case of
venture X, we dealt with it by...” The group often
referred to feelings and emotions in the investment
decisions: “I have a good feeling about this product. It
is so beautiful,” “I don’t like this…,” or “I don’t trust
this person.” These examples illustrate the taken-for-
granted, shared understanding, and the subjectively
agreed-upon criteria within the group, expressed
through analogies, feelings, emotions, and beliefs (i.e.,
based on compliance). Cognitive influence is based on
an internal orientation. The financiers discussed appli-
cations with varying degrees of passion, and their body
language helped express feelings of dislike or excite-
ment. For example, when the financiers had difficulty
understanding the product or the entrepreneur and
displayed a negative bias toward the application, we
sometimes heard statements such as “this entrepreneur
is suspect and is indulging in hocus pocus.” On such
occasions, the discussions revolved around the location
of the business or the reputation of the entrepreneur,
particularly when linked to previous poor performance,
which encouraged financiers to reject the application.
The examples in our observations and interviews sug-
gest that the justifications for decision outcomes were
built on what was comprehensible, recognizable, and
culturally and emotionally supported. Furthermore, cog-
nitive logic is characterized by bounded rationality or, in
some cases, irrationality in investment decisions.
Consistent with the literature on legitimacy in the
institutional framework (Scott 2014; Thornton et al.
2012), we found that the investment decisions were
subject to all three influences. Regulative influence
serves as the basis for or the input of the work, while
normative and cognitive influences are used to decide
on financing support. It should be noted, however, that
the regulative influence was used to justify the final
decision outcome but that any signs of the involvement
of norms or cognitions were absent from official
communications. Interestingly, although all three insti-
tutions were present in financiers’ investment decisions,
cases in which all three institutions supported a decision
were rare. This finding somewhat contradicts the tradi-
tional understanding of institutional theory in terms of
dynamism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2014)
and is close to the conceptualization in research on
fragmented institutions (Biniari et al. 2015; Friedland
1991; Greenwood et al. 2010; Pache and Santos 2010).
By carefully analyzing the impact of the three institu-
tions, we were able to identify meaningful implications
regarding the dominance of cognitive institutions, which
the institutional theory literature does not fully acknowl-
edge. Thus, we contribute by providing new knowledge
on how financial institutions deal with the multiplicity
of internal and external pressures by predominantly
leaning on cognitive institutions.
Notably, the institutionalized investment decision
framework involves all three types of institutions, with
the cognitive logic playing a dominant role in guiding
investment decision outcomes. Below, we elaborate on
these considerations and shed light on the official and
unofficial justifications for GVCs’ investment decisions.
4.2 The importance of the cognitive logic
and the presence of overshadowing forces
We observed that cognitive institutions substantially
influenced the way in which the decision making was
institutionalized. The cognitive influence underpins the
habitual ways of thinking and behaving within a partic-
ular organization. This was found to be the case with the
funding decisions by the GVCs (see Mouritsen 1994;
Sharma 2015). Furthermore, we noted that the cognitive
logic affected how complexity in investment decisions
was framed and how the financiers, in their discussions
prior to investment decisions, found solutions and justi-
fied decision outcomes in the absence of clear regulative
guidance (Greenwood et al. 2011; Thornton et al. 2012;
Lawrence et al. 2011).
In the context of this study, cognitive institutions
enabled financiers to orient their investment decisions
with a degree of assurance when facing multiple macro
logics. The GVCs often turned to bounded rationality
when relying on these multiple macro logics to assess
information and make decisions (Gabrielsson and Huse
2002). Certain decisions were somewhat irrational given
the major influence of the cognitive logic. We noted that
bounded rational-irrational cognitive frameworks were
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involved at critical decision points. These frameworks
helped financiers make more balanced decisions, ultimate-
ly reaching decisions where the regulative and normative
logicswere not satisfied orwhere the logics conflicted. The
financiers could thus act flexibly and renegotiate their
behavior from situation to situation (e.g., depending on
the pressure and direction for legitimation needed for
instance internal or external pressure or legitimation).
We assessed how much time the financiers spent
discussing important information and how the three insti-
tutional influences interacted. During these investment
decisions, GVCs discussed the key assessment indicators:
markets, production, and products (83% of the content),
human capital (10% of the content), and financial and
investment information (7% of the content). Previous stud-
ies of traditional venture capitalists have shown that the
financial and investment information and human capital
are the most critical assessment indicators and that venture
capitalists focus on what can be measured (Hall and Hofer
1993). GVCs use the same type of assessment indicators as
traditional venture capitalists, although they rely less on
measurable criteria. The venture capital literature has
moved away from the mere identification of assessment
indicators. We follow this trend by further examining the
behavioral aspects of decisionmaking. The structure of the
assessment indicators clearly relates to the imperative to
legitimize decisions; indeed, financiers’ decisions are legit-
imized to the extent that they conform to the existing basis
of compliance (Scott and Davis 2007; Trevino et al. 2008).
Such legitimatization is consistent with institutionalized
investment decisions (Gorman et al. 2005; MacMillan
et al. 1985). The discussions that focused on whether to
approve an application showed that the cognitive logic
played a crucial role in investment decisions. We observed
that 47% of discussions were associated with the cognitive
logic, 16% with the normative logic, and 14% with the
regulative logic. We also observed that the cognitive logic
appeared to be built on the four overshadowing forces
presented below, allowing it to dominate in the investment
decisions. In our view, the four overshadowing forces
ensured the dominance of the cognitive logic when the
institutional logics, including the normative and regulative
logics, were non-aligned.
First, formulating what we labeled the initial perspec-
tive to assess the venture application allowed the finan-
ciers to familiarize themselves with each venture and
each application. This is the deal originating phase in
Silva’s (2004) study of venture capital decision making.
The financiers in this phase used the cognitive logic to
assess venture information so that they could compre-
hend the venture, the investment, and the effects of the
investment (cf. Baum and Silverman 2004). The cogni-
tive logic is important early in the investment decision.
This phase emphasizes the GVCs’ perceptions, emo-
tional values, and lack of competence in relation to, for
example, products, markets, and regulations. Statements
such as the following illustrate this point:
This is an appealing product, both in design and
price, and the market channel is promising. So is
the entrepreneur, who created a good impression
at our meeting. I really have a good feeling about
this application.
Yes, as you know, we are all fond of these kinds of
products.
The converse is also true, as reflected by statements such
as the following:
We don’t know much about this type of product.
The ICT technology is really complex, and my
fear is that support will not make for improved
efficiency.
Doesn’t this product function like wiretapping and
societal control?We do not want to be part of such
activities. How can we get out of this one? What
regulation can we turn to?
These statements suggest that the financiers’ initial per-
spective also influenced the use of regulative and nor-
mative logics. Overall, initial learning about a venture
and forming an initial perspective laid the foundations
for the financiers to use the other institutional logics to
make a decision. This initial use of the cognitive logic
outlines dominance of cognitive logic.
By making sense of key assessment indicators and
attributes when processing venture applications, the finan-
ciers fashioned a social perception that produced a collec-
tive image of the venture. This social perception also
helped them evaluate the venture’s potential fit with the
multiple macro logics that the financiers used, thus widen-
ing the scope for funding approval. In many cases, the
financiers spent considerable time (up to 98%) developing
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a collective image and evaluating the venture’s potential.
Overall, forming the initial perspective proved important
for the ultimate financing decision because it oriented the
financiers’ thinking toward the use of the regulative and
normative logics. This was an overshadowing force be-
cause in cases where the initial perspective conflicted with
other logics, it was the initial perspective that determined
whether financial support was granted.
Second, what we categorized as expressions of pos-
itive or negative feelings regarding venture attributes
were part of the cognitive logic guiding the investment
decision. This phase corresponded to the deal evaluation
phase where judgment of the application took place and
where the GVCs determined the investment potential
(cf. Silva 2004). Like Cardon et al. (2009), we found
that the financiers often based their evaluations on their
passion for a venture application. Positive feelings about
the products and the entrepreneurs were advantageous
for ventures in securing funding. This phase highlighted
stereotypical expressions of what was considered
“right” and “wrong.” GVCs showed overconfidence in
investments due to emotions. This was expressed in
statements such as the following:
I am excited. This is an extremely talented man;
he’s a solid guy, and he is smart.
The entire team expressed approval. Other statements
reiterated the role of positive feelings:
I have a good feeling about this application; you
know I like this, and I want to approve it.
My gut feeling tells me that this will be a hit; let’s
approve…
The group often referred to negative feelings and emo-
tions in investment decisions:
I don’t like this; I would not like to be in their
shoes if they risk all in this investment...my whole
system signals a BIG NO.
I don’t trust this person ... I am very hesitant;
everything I sense leads me to a rejection.
Although limited time (between 20 and 30% of the
discussions) was devoted to expressing emotions, such
expressions based on the cognitive logic had a
substantial influence on decision outcomes when they
were verbalized. The use of both normative and regula-
tive logics was influenced by such expressions. In fact,
when feelings were expressed, discussions often took
new directions. Several cases were observed in which
expressing positive feelings ran counter to the regulative
logic but nevertheless received support upon revising
the normative logic. Such behavior caused inconsisten-
cy in the GVCs’ decisionmaking (cf. Dimov et al. 2007)
Third, financiers’ confirmation of themselves, in-
cluding their cognitive and social identity (e.g., being
government representatives with their attendant respon-
sibilities) and what we refer to as financiers’ cognitive
identity restriction guided investment decisions based
on financiers’ pre-existing value judgments of what can
be financed (Ashforth and Mael 1989; March and Olsen
1989; Thornton et al. 2012). This behavior refers to the
deal closing phase (cf. Silva 2004) involving rationali-
zation of the decision. The financiers in this phase often
voiced reputational concerns in relation to their roles as
GVC officers, their professional functions, and their
codes of conduct. Concerns of own reputation were
evident when the GVCs initiated their discussions with
statements such as the following:
We, as government venture capitalists can’t sup-
port this investment since this entrepreneur is sus-
pect and is indulging in hocus pocus. We have an
ethical responsibility to take [this] into account.
Our role is to approve financing where others do
not; we need to be risk takers if we are to make a
difference in terms of innovation and financing
newly founded businesses.
Given this cognitive identity restriction, the GVCs
discussed what they could or could not do and how they
were expected to act according to their roles (e.g., their
authority). Although only 9% of the discussions related
to this overshadowing force, it influenced their behavior
substantially when making their investment decisions
and discussing the granting of financial approval.
Fourth, the cognitive logic was used to formulate
decisions through what we call multiple-perspective
validation. This phase was also part of deal closing. It
refers to finding links between the financiers’ own
knowledge and how the financiers perceived the
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external expectations of multiple stakeholders such as
venture applicants, the media, municipalities, and poli-
ticians. This phase involved simplifying complex situa-
tions, suppressing information that did not support the
decision, and emphasizing information that did support
the decision. The GVC officers dealt with high com-
plexity and high uncertainty due to conflicting expecta-
tions and conflicting goals. The financiers developed
techniques to respond cognitively to macro logics while
legitimizing and rationalizing their investment deci-
sions. Statements such as the following support this
point:
Let’s express it like this to the media. Then we
know it will be appealing.
Be sure to communicate this clearly to this appli-
cant; otherwise, we will have a problem. This is a
troublemaker who will use his influential connec-
tions to question our decision…We know that the
municipality and politicians want us to support
tourism.
Our data show that this multiple-perspective validation
influenced the prospect of approving finance for entre-
preneurial endeavors. The financiers appeared to use
their bank contacts, the media, and politicians to test
their perspectives on how best to legitimize their invest-
ment decisions. Although this overshadowing force was
subtle, the multiple-perspective validation not only re-
moved some of the uncertainty but also made the work
appear rational (Scott 2014). We observed that 15% of
the discussions touched on the multiple-perspective val-
idation, and our observations support the importance of
this kind of discussion in influencing decisions
concerning venture capital approval. Again, these ob-
servations support the prominent role of the cognitive
logic.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The study of 125 funding decisions reveals that the
cognitive logic serves as a dominant logic for assessing
proposals and allocating finance. This dominance is
evident when financing is allocated based on the cogni-
tive logic, and the regulative and normative logics are
absent. The relative dominance of cognitive logic is
shown through the four overshadowing forces of (1)
initial perspective, (2) expression of positive or negative
feelings, (3) cognitive identity restriction, and (4)
multiple-perspective validation. The dominance of the
cognitive logic through these overshadowing forces can
be linked to cognitive consonance and cognitive disso-
nance (Festinger 1957; Shultz and Lepper 1996). Satis-
fying the cognitive logic could be interpreted as cogni-
tive consonance—that is, perceiving a fit between the
institutionalized image of an approvable venture appli-
cation and the venture application at hand. In contrast,
failing to satisfy the cognitive logic could be seen as
cognitive dissonance—that is, perceiving a lack of fit
between the institutionalized image of an approvable
venture application and the venture application at hand.
In Fig. 1, we illustrate how the four overshadowing
forces correspond to different stages of finance decision
making and influence other logics. During the first stage
(application screening), the financiers read, shortlisted,
and ranked the applications. During this decision stage,
GVCs were highly influenced by the cognitive logic
leading to an initial perception of the applications. For
example, during the screening of a successful applica-
tion, the financiers familiarized themselves with and
made sense of the applicant’s financial status, the indus-
try, and the social network. The positive initial percep-
tion led to expressing positive feelings about the busi-
ness concept. However, the financiers largely
overlooked regulative and normative logics. Issues such
as the regulations governing what to finance and the
interpretation that the business had low economic
growth potential were not critically considered as part
of the initial assessment.
The next decision phase focused on the application
decision, during which the financiers voted whether to
approve or reject the applications. As in the previous
phase, the cognitive logic influenced the expression of
positive or negative feelings about the application. The
overshadowing force of the cognitive logic came across
in meetings through the use of strong words and moti-
vations that were meant to justify the underuse of the
other logics. The final phase of decision validation was
where the financiers justified their decisions internally
and externally to diverse stakeholders such as the entre-
preneurs, the public, and the media. During this stage,
the forces of cognitive identity restriction and seeking
multiple-perspective validation were dominant. Ex-
pressing cognitive identity restrictions was also used
by the GVCs to reinforce their own position as govern-
mental officers in certain meetings. Another example is
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financiers’ use of multiple-perspective validation when
referring to an external municipality organization and to
media reactions to the decision. Normative and regula-
tive logics such as validating decisions in accordance
with stipulated regulations or norms on how to navigate
decision outcomes between complementary or conflict-
ing assessment indicators were largely conducted based
on individual financiers’ attempts to apply their internal
identity restrictions and seek multiple-perspective ap-
proval. Thus, the four overshadowing forces facilitate
the decision outcome, illustrate the dominance of the
cognitive logic, and show how financiers arrive at cog-
nitive consonance even with or without the influence of
the normative and regulative logics.
5.1 Theoretical implications
Our findings suggest that an institutional framework
aids our understanding of the institutional setting and
organizational behavior in terms of how GVCs work
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Douglas et al. 2008; Peng
et al. 2009; Scott 2014) and our understanding of the
social behavior that takes place in the capital market
when government capital is distributed. The findings
show that the contradictions between regulations,
norms, and individual cognitions should be highlighted.
When regulative and normative logics are not satisfied
by the application, the cognitive logic tends to dominate
GVCs’ decision making. This finding is surprising be-
cause of the importance of the regulations that GVCs are
supposed to follow in their decision making. The regu-
lative and normative logics serve as the basis for or input
to the decision process, but the cognitive logic nonethe-
less dominates the process and the decision outcomes.
The most substantial contribution of our study to
research on behavior in entrepreneurial financing and
venture capital decision making relates to the domi-
nance of the cognitive logic in highly complex and
incongruent decision environments. Specifically, we
contribute to institutional theory, particularly the entre-
preneurial finance literature on venture capitalists’ deci-
sion making, by developing new conceptualizations
(i.e., the identification of four overshadowing forces that
illuminate how GVCs are able to selectively turn their
attention to particular cognitive cues and sway their
decisions). Our findings are novel in that they highlight
how selective bounded attention shapes the way that
problems are framed when searching for solutions.
Using selective overshadowing forces allows GVCs to
neglect the regulative and normative logics. This finding
shows how the cognitive logic overrules other logics in
reaching decisions. This paper also shows that relying
on the cognitive logic allows for discretionary action
and inhibits predictable results. Thus, our research re-
sponds to the calls in the institutional logic literature for
“a full understanding of the role of social actors in
Cognive logic
Regulave logic Normave logic
1. Applicaon 
screening
2. Applicaon 
decision
3. Decision 
validaon
Overshadowing forces
1. Inial percepon, 2. Expressing posive or 
negave, 3a. Cognive identy restricon, 
3b. Seeking mulple perspecve. 
Governmental venture capital decision stages
Fig. 1 Importance of the
cognitive logic and the presence
of overshadowing forces
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shaping and being shaped by institutions requires a more
developed theory of human behavior” (Thornton et al.
2012). More contextualized knowledge is needed to
understand and enrich “how to interpret organizational
reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and
how to succeed” in an organizational setting
(Thornton 2004, p. 70). Thus, we outline hetero-
geneity in venture capitalists’ decision making
(i.e., critical differences between GVCs and tradi-
tional venture capitalists). Our specific integration
of this macro-oriented literature of institutional
theory with that of the micro-oriented framework
that we developed by drawing upon the work of
Scott (2014) yields several insights into how these
actors deal with a complex, multi-layered decision
environment with competing institutional logics.
Our findings are based on an integration of sev-
eral ideas from institutional theory, which we also
believe to be a contribution in its own right. While
the institutional framework developed by Scott
(2014) indicates that social behavior is constrained
and guided by regulative, normative, and cognitive
systems, the literature on institutional logic has a
broader scope and acknowledges the institutional
logic from macro to micro levels guiding social
behavior (Thornton et al. 2012). However, our study
provides detailed insights based on observations and
interviews, which have been largely lacking in prior
studies. By describing stories and events during dif-
ferent phases of the decision-making process, we
illustrate the breakdown of how the cognitive
overshadowing forces influence rejection or approval
decisions in a GVC context. The complexity and
dynamics in the decision meetings provide a novel
context for studying institutional factors and identi-
fying micro-level insights. We thus offer support for
the institutional influences reported in our study. The
literature on institutional logic suggests that what is
considered the broader institutions and the “princi-
ples, practices and symbols of each institutional logic
shape how reasoning takes place in assessment
work” (Thornton et al. 2012: 2). The main insight
of this study is that although social behavior in
investment decisions is influenced by multiple macro
to micro institutional forms of logic, the cognitive
logic dominates in complex, uncertain situations. We
thus respond to scholars’ calls for knowledge on the
interplay between the micro-individual and the meso-
structural dynamics of institutional theory.
5.2 Practical implications
Although there are limitations regarding the generaliza-
tion of our findings, the potential dominance of the
cognitive logic suggests that entrepreneurs must ensure
that financiers not only understand their applications but
also perceive how the applications appeal to the cogni-
tive logic. Applicants should understand that the regu-
lative and normative logics do not need to be satisfied.
Investors go against these logics, instead relying on
cognitions and decision heuristics. This finding is con-
sistent with Grilli and Murtini’s findings (2016) that
GVCs’ investment decisions could be subject to distor-
tions and imperfections (e.g., “pork barrel” spending).
Moreover, our study has implications for the general
outline of government support for ventures. The litera-
ture indicates the need to develop strong institutional-
ized investment decision routines to reduce decision
uncertainty (Gorman et al. 2005; Larson 1977). We
enrich this discussion by presenting a framework that
shows how institutionalization reduces uncertainty and
enables decisions in settings characterized by multiple
and contrasting institutional influences. These cognitive
influences create a manageable situation for financiers
while facilitating a high degree of variation in assessing
applications and allowing discretionary decision out-
comes. Government support programs for venturing
should take note of the multifaceted nature of this situ-
ation to enable continuous questioning of habits and de-
institutionalization for healthy re-institutionalization of
decision-making behavior (i.e., behavior that make an
impact on allocation of resources and performance
outcomes).
5.3 Limitations and future studies
Our research has several limitations. We encourage fu-
ture studies to use larger samples of financiers to test our
findings. Such studies can assess the reliability and
validity of our results and extend knowledge on invest-
ment decisions in institutional frameworks. This study
observes the dominant institutional logic of cognitions
and the occurrence of this logic in multiple situations. A
longitudinal study with a larger number of cases may
well reveal the pattern of emergence and relative dom-
inance of the cognitive logic over time. Institutional
logics are not static; they adapt to social systems and
typically evolve over time. Therefore, future longitudi-
nal studies should consider the evolution over longer
J. Johansson et al.
time horizons than the present study considers. Like
other scholars, we also advocate exploratory studies that
consider institutional theory concerning the circum-
stances of investment decisions. While our study is
limited in number of decision meetings and decisions
covered, we hope to encourage researchers to elaborate
on this topic. We encourage entrepreneurial finance
scholars to expand our understanding of a variety of
financial sources by adding to and going beyond tradi-
tional venture capital research to better understand high-
growth-potential and innovation financing (Block et al.
2018; Drover et al. 2017). We encourage researchers to
develop a nuanced view of decision making beyond the
rational formulas and rigid approaches, to dig deeper
into the cognitive, multifaceted, contingent nature of
financial decision making, and to move beyond the
obvious (Kirsch et al. 2009; Petty and Gruber 2011;
Sharma 2015).
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